What Ethiopia Would Have Had to Do at Each Turn

Thesis

The four Ethiopian turns examined in Articles 20 through 23 — the imperial window under Haile Selassie (1930–1974 with the specific Eritrean case 1952–1962), the Derg period (1974–1991), the EPRDF framework (1991–2018), and the Abiy Opening (2018–2026) — each represented specific windows at which the developmental and identity-construction outcomes the successful Asian comparators produced could have been executed under conditions comparable to what those comparators had accomplished. At each window, the specific integration of the five conditions was not accomplished. The specific pattern — Condition 1 (land reform) executed twice (Derg 1975, arguably imperial partial reforms through the 1950s and 1960s), Conditions 2 through 5 progressively executed in structural form but never integrated with sustained institutional continuity — is what this article synthesises. The article then constructs the specific counterfactuals — what each Ethiopian regime would have had to do at its particular window to produce the outcomes the successful Asian comparators produced — and identifies the specific pattern of missed integration that has persisted across the ninety-five years of the modern Ethiopian state.

The article’s argument is that the specific missed integrations at each window were substantively knowable at the time. The imperial framework had access to the Meiji Japanese case (available from 1868), the immediate post-war Japanese case (available from 1945-52), and the early Korean and Taiwanese developmental transformations (available from the 1960s). The Derg framework had access to all of these plus the mature Korean, Taiwanese, and Singaporean cases (all substantially developed by the mid-1970s). The EPRDF framework had access to all of the above plus the Deng-era Chinese case, the Malaysian NEP outcomes, the Indonesian case, and the extensive comparative-developmental-state literature that Meles Zenawi himself engaged in his revolutionary-democracy formulation. The Abiy framework has had access to all of the above plus the specific 2020s literature on post-conflict identity construction, comparative constitutional reform, and the specific institutional-innovation literature. The specific pattern of missed integration has not been produced by absence of information. It has been produced by the political-economy configuration that has made unconstrained executive authority more valuable to successive regimes than the constructive integration the successful comparators executed. This is the specific proposition Part VII will engage.

The imperial window (1930-1974): what could have been done

Haile Selassie’s specific window had substantial favourable features — independent sovereignty, imperial identity infrastructure, external diplomatic recognition, external assistance, political authority sufficient for transformation. What would have been required to convert this window into the specific developmental-identity transformation:

Comprehensive land reform, executed comprehensively rather than partially. The specific pattern of imperial land arrangements — Church gult holdings, noble rist claims, southern-provincial landlord networks — needed to be systematically dismantled through comprehensive land reform. The specific model — comparable to the Japanese post-war reform or the Korean-Taiwanese reforms — would have destroyed the pre-existing landowning coalition and produced the smallholder rural base that subsequent developmental work would have built on. This was not done. The 1955 Constitution’s Article 130 nominally recognised imperial land ownership subject to peasant use-rights but did not translate into operational reform.

Universal primary education in a shared national language with pan-Ethiopian curriculum. The specific imperial approach to education — expansion from very low base but not to universal levels, with Amharic-language content — needed to be expanded to universal primary enrollment (as the Asian comparators had accomplished at their comparable stages) with curriculum that addressed pan-Ethiopian identity construction rather than imperial-Amharic identity extension. The specific content — Ethiopian historical narrative that incorporated Aksumite, Oromo, southern-nationality, Muslim, and Eritrean traditions as constitutive components rather than as peripheral variations — needed to be constructed. This was not done.

Meritocratic bureaucracy with substantial insulation from personal-imperial direction. The specific imperial civil-service framework — professional in structural form but operationally patrimonial — needed to be transformed toward the specific meritocratic-technocratic form the Asian comparators developed. The specific mechanism — competitive examinations, institutional insulation from imperial personal direction, high compensation, anti-corruption infrastructure — needed to be established. This was not done at the required scale.

Export-oriented industrialisation with performance discipline. The specific imperial industrial strategy — some import-substitution, some coffee export, limited industrial development — needed to be transformed toward the specific export-oriented model the Asian comparators developed. The specific mechanism — state-directed credit through insulated banking, sectoral protection conditional on export performance, foreign-technology absorption through specific institutional arrangements — needed to be established. This was not done.

Eritrean federation preserved and deepened as constitutional-identity accommodation. The specific 1952-1962 window at which Eritrean federation autonomy could have been preserved and deepened — recognition of Eritrean political distinctness as durable feature, Tigrinya and Arabic co-equal with Amharic, integrated developmental investment, political incorporation, religious accommodation — was not taken. Instead, the specific erosion of federation autonomy and the 1962 dissolution produced the thirty-year war and the eventual 1993 separation.

The specific integration. Each of these moves would have needed to be executed as part of one sustained developmental-identity project, not as separate initiatives. The Asian comparators executed them integrated. The imperial framework, when it executed elements, executed them in isolation.

The Derg window (1974-1991): what could have been done

The Derg’s specific window had a substantial specific first-move achievement (the 1975 land reform) that positioned it favourably for subsequent developmental-identity work. What would have been required to convert this window into transformation:

Reform’s tenure security addressed. The specific limitation of the 1975 reform — state ownership with peasant use-rights subject to state administrative decision — needed to be addressed through some form of individual tenure security. The specific mechanism — long-term leases, hereditary use-rights protected from administrative interference, or eventually private title — was not specified, but some form of secure individual tenure was needed to permit the rural investment that would have complemented the political-economic transformation.

Non-Marxist-Leninist identity framework. The specific Derg framework — Marxist-Leninist revolutionary content — was destructive of the pre-1974 imperial identity but did not produce a durable pan-Ethiopian alternative. What was needed was a specific identity framework that could have integrated the imperial-Christian-Amharic inheritance (as one component) with the Oromo, Somali, southern-nationality, and Muslim Ethiopian traditions (as constitutive components) into a shared pan-Ethiopian identity. This was not done; the Derg’s specific ideological framework foreclosed the specific identity work required.

End of the wars through negotiated settlement rather than continued military campaign. The specific wars with Eritrea and Somalia consumed substantial Derg resources and prevented the specific developmental-identity work from proceeding. What would have been required — negotiated settlement with the EPLF (recognising Eritrean political distinctness within some form of continuing federation-of-communities framework), negotiated settlement with the Somali claim in the Ogaden — would have released developmental resources for the specific transformation work. This was not done; the Derg’s specific commitment to territorial reunification through military means produced the specific resource-consumption pattern that prevented the transformation.

Avoidance of the Red Terror. The specific 1976-1978 Red Terror against political opposition killed substantial portions of the Ethiopian educated urban population. The specific human-capital cost was severe. What would have been required — political accommodation of the specific opposition (EPRP, Meison, and others) through negotiation and progressive incorporation rather than through violent elimination — would have preserved the specific human capital needed for subsequent developmental-institutional work. This was not done.

Sustained institutional continuity. The specific pattern of framework repudiation at succession — the 1991 EPRDF arrival being followed by substantial repudiation of the Derg’s specific institutional framework — needed to be prevented through negotiated managed transition. The specific mechanism — recognition of the developmental-institutional infrastructure the Derg had constructed as national inheritance requiring continuity rather than as regime property requiring elimination — would have preserved the specific developmental capacity that was largely destroyed in 1991. This was not done.

The specific integration. The Derg’s specific opportunity was to build on the 1975 land reform’s foundation with the other four conditions. The specific opportunity was foreclosed by the wars, the Red Terror, the specific Marxist-Leninist ideological framework’s identity-destructive content, and the specific institutional pattern that could not sustain across the 1991 transition.

The EPRDF window (1991-2018): what could have been done

The EPRDF’s specific window had the substantial specific advantages of the post-Cold War environment (external assistance without ideological conditionality, substantial technical and financial resources), the inherited land-reform framework (structural first-move accomplished by Derg), and the specific institutional infrastructure the EPRDF constructed across the 2000s and 2010s. What would have been required to convert this window into transformation:

Constitutional framework producing pan-Ethiopian identity rather than institutionalising sub-national identities. The specific 1995 Constitution’s Article 8 (sovereignty in nationalities), Article 39 (self-determination right), Article 47 (ethnic-territorial regional structure), and House of Federation composition — all needed to be constructed differently. The specific alternative — recognition of Ethiopian diversity without institutionalising it as constitutional sovereignty, on the specific model India and Indonesia provide — would have created constitutional infrastructure that supported pan-Ethiopian identity construction rather than working against it. This was not done. The specific commitments to the ethnic-federal framework — which had been the specific concession securing the 1991 anti-Derg coalition — were carried into the constitutional framework and codified.

Pan-Ethiopian curriculum coordination alongside regional-language education. The specific regional-language education policy was defensible in its recognition of Ethiopian linguistic diversity, but the absence of pan-Ethiopian curriculum coordination — shared historical narrative, shared cultural references, shared identity content — was the specific failure. What would have been required — pan-Ethiopian curriculum coordination developed alongside the regional-language variants, with substantial state investment in curriculum development, teacher training, translation infrastructure, and cross-regional media — was not done at scale.

Meritocratic bureaucracy insulated from EPRDF political direction. The specific EPRDF Civil Service Reform Program from 1996 constructed institutional infrastructure in form but did not achieve the operational insulation of technocratic institutions from political direction that the Asian comparators produced. The specific mechanism — that promotion, budgeting, and career progression were substantially influenced by EPRDF political networks — meant that technocratic capacity was operationally constrained by political criteria. What would have been required — comprehensive insulation of civil-service career progression from political direction, on the specific Singaporean or Korean model — was not done.

Export-oriented industrial policy with sustained performance discipline. The specific Growth and Transformation Plans and industrial-park model attempted the export-oriented framework but did not sustain the specific performance discipline the Korean chaebol framework had enforced. What would have been required — sustained enforcement of export-performance requirements on Ethiopian firms receiving state credit and protection, comprehensive dismantling of the specific EFFORT and regional-ethnic-political economic networks that operated on non-performance criteria — was not done.

Sustained managed political opening. The specific 2005 election crisis and its aftermath foreclosed the specific window at which the EPRDF framework could have opened toward the political consolidation that would have sustained developmental-identity work across succession. What would have been required — the 2005 election results respected and the specific opposition parties incorporated into subsequent constitutional and institutional development — was not done. The specific post-2005 consolidation instead reduced the pan-Ethiopian political infrastructure that could have supported the identity work.

Managed democratic transition rather than 2015-2018 mass mobilisation. The specific window at which the EPRDF framework could have transitioned to more competitive electoral politics under sustained institutional development — analogous to the specific Taiwanese managed transition under Chiang Ching-kuo — was not taken. The specific 2015-2018 mass mobilisation produced the leadership transition through pressure rather than through managed institutional development. The specific difference — that Taiwan’s managed transition preserved the developmental-institutional framework while opening political competition, while Ethiopia’s 2018 transition produced substantial framework repudiation under the Prosperity Party — is one of the specific institutional-execution failures.

The specific integration. The EPRDF’s specific opportunity was to combine the substantial developmental achievements with pan-Ethiopian identity construction that could have consolidated the developmental progress into durable political-economic transformation. The specific opportunity was foreclosed by the constitutional framework’s institutionalisation of sub-national identities and by the specific pattern of political-institutional development that did not sustain the pan-Ethiopian project.

The Abiy window (2018-2026): what could have been done, and what could still be done

The Abiy Opening from 2018 represents the specific window most immediately available to the present political moment. What would have been required to convert the 2018-2019 opening into sustained transformation:

Comprehensive constitutional dialogue in the 2018-2019 window. The specific opening — with political-prisoner releases, initial political de-escalation, international legitimation, and pan-Ethiopian identity aspiration — provided the specific window at which comprehensive constitutional dialogue could have proceeded. The specific participants — federal government, TPLF, OLF, OFC, Amhara-nationalist formations, southern-nationality organisations, civil society, religious institutions — could have engaged in the specific dialogue that the 2020 election postponement subsequently made impossible. This was not done.

Sustained institutional strengthening rather than institutional consolidation. The specific 2018-2019 window permitted institutional strengthening — independent constitutional review mechanism, independent electoral commission, independent judiciary, protected press, autonomous civil society, meritocratic-insulated civil service. The specific pattern that developed — institutional consolidation under Prosperity Party dominance rather than institutional strengthening under multi-party framework — foreclosed the specific institutional-strengthening opportunity.

Integration of Medemer symbolic content with operational infrastructure. The specific Medemer framework’s identity content — pan-Ethiopian identity as coming together of diverse inheritances — required the specific operational infrastructure to make it operative. Pan-Ethiopian curriculum development, pan-Ethiopian media coordination, pan-Ethiopian civil-service reform, integrated developmental investment — these operational moves needed to accompany the symbolic content. The specific detachment of symbolic identity work from operational infrastructure produced the specific failure to sustain the identity work as institutional pattern.

Sustained Eritrean rapprochement. The specific 2018 rapprochement — operational recognition of Eritrean legitimacy within improved bilateral relations — needed to be sustained through the 2020s. The specific pattern — Eritrean role in Tigray war, subsequent Assab framing, 2025-2026 deterioration — represents the failure to sustain. Sustained rapprochement would have supported the specific identity-construction opportunity that the 2018 opening had created.

Managed political opening in 2020 rather than postponement. The specific 2020 election could have proceeded under COVID-adjusted arrangements rather than being postponed through the specific June 2020 House of Federation constitutional interpretation. The specific alternative — modified election procedures, extended voting periods, health-adjusted campaign frameworks — would have preserved the 2018 political opening. The specific postponement, as examined in “The Hollow Pillar,” instead produced the specific constitutional crisis that led to the Tigray war.

Alternative to Amhara Special Forces dissolution. The specific April 2023 dissolution of the Amhara Special Forces was structurally consistent with the security-sector centralisation programme. The specific execution — without negotiated framework with Amhara regional political actors, without integration into a broader federal security-sector reform, without sustained political consultation — produced the specific Fano insurgency. The specific alternative — negotiated integration of the Amhara Special Forces into federal security services on terms preserving specific regional interests — would have prevented the specific 2023-2026 conflict.

Continued opportunity through 2026-2028. The specific window has not fully closed as of mid-2026. The specific National Dialogue Commission process, the specific post-2026 election political framework, and the specific opportunity for constitutional-reform work continue to be available. Whether the specific political-economy configuration will support the required integration is the question Part VII engages.

The pattern

The specific pattern of missed integration across the four windows:

Imperial (1930-1974). Substantial favourable conditions. Windows for land reform, education expansion, meritocratic bureaucracy, industrial development, and identity construction integrated with the Eritrean federation. Integration not accomplished. Framework collapsed in 1974.

Derg (1974-1991). Substantial first-move achievement (land reform). Windows for the other four conditions on the reform’s foundation. Integration not accomplished. Framework collapsed in 1991.

EPRDF (1991-2018). Substantial post-Cold War advantages, inherited land-reform, developmental infrastructure construction. Windows for constitutional-framework construction that supported pan-Ethiopian identity, sustained institutional strengthening, and managed political transition. Integration not accomplished. Framework transitioned through mass mobilisation in 2018.

Abiy (2018-2026). Substantial 2018 political opening, pan-Ethiopian identity aspiration, international legitimation, Eritrean rapprochement. Windows for constitutional dialogue, institutional strengthening, and integrated identity-developmental work. Integration substantially not accomplished across the 2020-2026 period. Framework in ongoing crisis as of mid-2026, with three simultaneous armed conflicts and deteriorating regional environment.

The specific pattern is the specific institutional pattern. The specific political-economy configuration that has repeatedly produced the missed integrations — the executive-centred political framework, the specific institutional weaknesses, the specific external pressures — has persisted across the four windows despite the specific different ideological frameworks of the four regimes. The specific pattern examined in “The Hollow Pillar” Article 24 is the same pattern the present series has been examining from a different angle: the identity-construction failure and the constitutional-institutional failure are aspects of the same underlying political-economy configuration.

What comes next

Part VII synthesises the accumulated framework and prescribes. Article 25 examines constructing Ethiopian identity as a working definition. Article 26 examines the housing and integration question — the specific Singapore-style policy for Ethiopian implementation. Article 27 examines the political-economy preconditions and the specific constituencies that would support the integration. Article 28 examines the chance that may still exist.

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The specific pattern across the four Ethiopian windows is not information failure. It is political-economy failure. The information about what needed to be done at each window was available. The political-economy configuration that would have delivered the specific integration was not. Part VII takes up whether the configuration can be constructed.